February 19 , 2025
Isabella Castro
Since the commencement of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Union (EU) has shown unwavering support for Ukraine by asserting massive and unprecedented sanctions against Russia. The objective of these sanctions is to gradually weaken Russia’s monetary base by depriving it of critical technology and markets to diminish its capacity to wage war (European Council, 2024). However, Russian circumvention of sanctions with the aid of third-party nations curtails their effectiveness. This blog will explore EU economic sanctions on Russia that target its technology and Russian circumvention of EU sanctions with the assistance of Central Asian states.
As of December 16th, 2024, the EU is officially on its 15th sanction package. Over time, the sanctions have embargoed the exportation of “critical technology” like arms-related materials, drones, and anything that can potentially aid the Russian Federation in winning the war against Ukraine (European Council, 2024). Although this ban should limit Russia’s access to critical technology, Russian circumvention is bolstered by third-party nations.
Bound by proximity, shared history, and the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia turned primarily to nations like Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan to import sanctioned items (Torres, 2024). Kazakstan has been vital to Russia because, under the Eurasian Economic Union, members are not subject to customs checks, so Kazakstan has been selling sanctioned technology to Russia, like drones and microchips, unhindered (Zholobova et al., 2023). Kazakstan’s complicity is noted in the numbers. In 2021, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, so few drones were imported to Kazakstan that they did not appear in official import-export data; however, in 2022, the country bought nearly $5 million worth of drones sold for $1.23 million to Russia (Zholobova et al., 2023).
Moreover, Russian circumvention is aided by a fatal flaw in EU sanctions. The defect is that Western countries’ subsidiaries in third countries are left to trade with Russia freely via an intermediary since the sanctions solely affect the companies at home (Shagina, 2024). The fault is exploited because German exports to Kyrgyzstan increased more than tenfold after the EU placed sanctions on Russia in 2022; there is little doubt that Kyrgyzstan acted as a middleman to import items it purchased to Russia (Shagina, 2024).
In response to Russian circumvention of sanctions, the EU has taken steps to thwart circumvention. One step the EU has taken is to embargo Central Asian companies that have allegedly aided Moscow with their war effort. For instance, on their 12th sanction package, the EU sanctioned the Kazah company “Aspan Arba” for “allegedly” importing drones and selling them to the Russian company “Sky Mechanics,” who then sold them to a company linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex (Standish, 2023).
Another step the EU has taken to prevent circumvention is the “no Russia” clause in its 14th sanction package. The “no Russia” clause requires EU companies to make their “best efforts” to prohibit the re-exportation of critical goods to Russia when doing business with third-party business partners (Shagina, 2024). Companies or individuals who violate sanction terms can face heavy fines or jail time (Shagina, 2024). This harsh stance on Russian circumvention has garnered public approval, but others argue the EU should instill secondary sanctions on third-party nations aiding Moscow.
Critics argue that the EU should implement secondary sanctions on Central Asian nations facilitating Russian circumvention because taking this “aggressive step” will force Kremlin-supporting nations to comply with sanctions, complicate Russia’s diversion strategies, and ultimately complicate its ability to wage war on Ukraine (Torres, 2024).
On the other hand, those against secondary sanctions worry about the risk of pushing Central Asia closer to Moscow to gain financial support after being struck by sanctions and ultimately damaging political and economic ties with the West (Bekmurzaev, 2023).
Whether or not to instill secondary sanctions is a divisive issue, but as of today, the EU has yet to engage in them. However, as Russia continues to evade sanctions, the EU is more willing to adopt measures that go beyond its borders, which could include secondary sanctions (Shagina, 2024). Thus, it cannot be ruled out.
In conclusion, the EU has attempted to limit the amount of critical technology entering Russia since the commencement of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. However, Russian circumvention aided by Central Asian nations curtails Brussels’s sanctions’ effectiveness. While the EU has implemented strategies to combat circumvention, there is still a debate on whether it should instill secondary sanctions on countries aiding Moscow.
EU sanctions on Russia will remain a hot topic for the EU as the Russia-Ukraine war continues.
Works Cited
Bekmurzaev, N. (2023, May 18). Will the EU slap sanctions on Central Asia?. Jamestown. https://jamestown.org/program/will-the-eu-slap-sanctions-on-central-asia/
European Council . (2024, December 2). EU sanctions against Russia explained – consilium. EU sanctions against Russia explained. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/
Shagina, M. (2024, October 8). Europe expands its sanctions reach. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/07/sanctions-russia-evasion-eu-europe-uk-secondary-economic-warfare/
Standish, R. (2023, November 15). EU takes aim at more Central Asian firms for aiding Russian war effort in Ukraine. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-targets-central-asia-aiding-russia-war-ukraine/32685925.html
Torres, A. (2024, January 8). Russia continues to evade sanctions – the west must stop it. bushcenter.org. https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/russia-continues-to-evade-sanctions-the-west-must-stop-it
Zholobova, M., Bidder , B., Abramov, V., & Lozovsky, I. (2023, May 19). Kazakhstan has become a pathway for the supply of Russia’s war machine. here’s how it works. OCCRP. https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/kazakhstan-has-become-a-pathway-for-the-supply-of-russias-war-machine-heres-how-it-works